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The fragile returns to investor relations:
evidence from a period of declining market
confidence
KENNETH PEASNELL, SAYJDA TALIB∗ and STEVEN YOUNG
Department of Accounting and Finance, Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster,
LA1 4YX, UK
This paper assesses the capital market effects of investor relations activities during a period of
high-profile corporate scandals. We find no support for the prediction that an established
reputation for effective investor relations helped shield US firms from a perceived decline in
management credibility and financial reporting integrity associated with Enron and related
scandals. On the contrary, tests reveal that firms with an established reputation for superior
investor relations activities fared worse on a series of market-related factors. Results suggest
that distrust in corporate reporting practices spilled over to investor relations practices, and
that best practice investor relations programmes developed during normal market conditions
offered little protection from systemic declines in investor confidence arising from the
corporate misdeeds of other firms.
Keywords: investor relations; financial reporting credibility; accounting scandals; market
reaction
1. Introduction
The process of communication between companies and external audiences has evolved signifi-
cantly. Amongst these changes, radical development in investor relations has been observed,
such that the function has evolved into a full-time professional operation in many firms
(Marston and Straker 2001, Marston 2008). High-profile accounting and corporate governance
scandals such as Enron, coupled with the legal and regulatory responses to these scandals, raise
important questions about the role played by corporate communications generally and investor
relations in particular (Allen 2002, Argenti et al. 2005). Beginning with Enron, the wave of
high-profile accounting and corporate governance scandals that engulfed US financial markets
during 2001 and 2002 placed corporate credibility under the microscope and led to both a crisis
in investor confidence and increased investor scepticism about capital market valuations (Allen
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2002, Bratton 2002, Asthana et al. 2008). Against this backdrop, we explore the role of investor
relations in helping to maintain the trust and confidence of investors. Our empirical tests contrast a
sample of 122 companies recognised for their superior investor relations practices by the US
Investor Relations Magazine Awards (IRMA) with a matched control sample of non-IRMA firms.
Our tests seek to distinguish empirically between the following two competing views of inves-
tor relations. Proponents of investor relations argue that effective investor relations have a positive
impact on firm share price because more informative, timely and accurate communication helps
improve the reliability of investors’ valuation models and build corporate reputation (Brennan and
Tamarowski 2000, Metzker 2002, Bushee and Miller 2010, Jong et al. 2007, Agarwal et al. 2008).
If this is the case then firms with high-quality investor relations are expected to have experienced a
less pronounced decline in investor confidence between October 2001 and September 2002 (here-
inafter referred to as the scandal period) relative to our control sample. The alternative view of
investor relations is that such activities merely involve a sophisticated repackaging of available
information and therefore have little impact on investor confidence (Farragher et al. 1994).
Indeed, heightened market scepticism over the perceived lack of management credibility could
have led cynical investors to view investor relations as little more than a corporate marketing
device designed to exaggerate stocks’ prospects and put a positive spin on reported performance.
From this viewpoint, firms associated with active investor relations programmes may have fared
little better (or even worse) during this scandal period relative to our control sample.
Empirical tests compare a series of market-related variables and outcomes for IRMA and non-
IRMA firms during a window spanning the period October 2001 through September 2002. Our
first set of tests examines the stock price reaction of IRMA and control firms to Enron-related
news of financial reporting failures. The aim of these contagion tests is to assess how market par-
ticipants viewed firms with active investor relations programmes relative to firms with less estab-
lished communication records. Results provide no support for the prediction that an established
reputation for effective investor relations helped shield firms from the systematic decline in inves-
tor confidence experienced during this period. On the contrary, results indicate that firms with
active investor relations programmes suffered larger stock price falls relative to firms in the
control sample. In our second set of tests we examine relative changes over the pre- to post-
scandal period in a series of variables indentified by Bushee and Miller (2010) as being influenced
positively by investor relations activity. The variables include press coverage, trading volume and
analyst coverage. In so far as a reputation for high-quality investor relations serves to insulate
firms against a general decline in investor sentiment, IRMA firms are expected to have experi-
enced less negative shocks to these variables over the scandal period compared with the non-
IRMA control sample. However, results of our differences-in-differences tests suggest that
IRMA firms experienced a more pronounced decline in press coverage, trading volume and
analyst coverage relative to their non-IRMA counterparts. Collectively, these results cast doubt
on the positive role that effective investor relations is predicted to play in upholding trust and con-
fidence of investors, at least during turbulent market conditions. Our findings also suggest that
the reputation of the investor relations industry may have been tarnished during this period.
Our study contributes to the small body of research investigating the capital market effects of
investor relations. Both Bushee and Miller (2010) and Agarwal et al. (2008) document capital
market benefits arising from increased investor relations activities. On the other hand, Farragher
et al. (1994) fail to find any significant relation between the quality of investor relations and the
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. To the extent that investor relations departments strive to enhance
communication in an effort to build trust between firms and the market, one might expect the role
and effect of investor relations to be particularly important during a period of deteriorating market
confidence in the credibility and integrity of corporate America. While prior research explores the
role of investor relations under regular market conditions, ours is the first study to consider the




























costs and benefits of investor relations activities when the general standards of corporate honesty
are called into question. On balance our results suggest that during periods of heightened market
scepticism concerning accounting quality and management credibility, a reputation for superior
investor relations performance provides no guarantee that a firm will be insulated from declines
in investor confidence arising from the corporate misdeeds of other firms. In fact, there is some
evidence that distrust in corporate reporting practices led to heightened scepticism about investor
relations practices in general.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the extant litera-
ture. Section 3 develops our research question. Section 4 describes the measure of investor
relations quality and Section 5 provides details of our research design. Section 6 describes the
sample selection process and presents descriptive statistics. Empirical results and additional
robustness tests are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Prior research
Theoretical support linking investor relations with improved valuation comes predominately from
the disclosure literature. In Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), adverse selection costs of trading
reduce stock liquidity, thereby depressing stock price. Effective investor relations in the form
of superior disclosure is predicted to help reduce adverse selection problems, thereby improving
stock liquidity and raising stock price.1 Theory also suggests that investor relations can help boost
stock prices when investors have limited awareness or incomplete information. In Merton (1987),
risk-averse investors avoid stocks about which they know nothing. By improving investor aware-
ness of a firm, the investor relations function can help broaden the investor base and hence
increase stock price (through improved risk sharing).
Agarwal et al. (2008) examine the market value of investor relations activity using Investor
Relations Magazine Investor Relations Awards nominees as a proxy for investor relations quality.
Consistent with effective investor relations reducing risks associated with high information asym-
metry, they document that firms in receipt of a nomination earn superior abnormal returns and
enjoy increased stock liquidity during the post-award period. In related work, Bushee and
Miller (2010) examine 210 small and mid-cap US firms that hired investor relations consultants
to develop their communication strategy. Consistent with the predicted benefits of investor
relations, significant increases in corporate disclosures, media coverage, analyst following and
institutional ownership are detected following the decision to hire an investor relations pro-
fessional. Their findings are consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996), Francis et al. (1997),
Bushee and Noe (2000) and Chang et al. (2008). Bushee and Miller (2010) also report statistically
significant pricing gains (measured as a decrease in the book-to-price ratio) for firms hiring the
services of an investor relations consultant. In an Australian context, Chang et al. (2008) use a
web-based survey to rate firms’ investor relations practices and find that firms engaging in con-
tinuous, high-quality disclosure benefit from lower information asymmetry and smaller infor-
mation asymmetry shocks around earnings announcements.
Survey research conducted by Marston (2008) among the top 500 UK companies finds that
although the creation of shareholder value is one of the most important issues discussed at inves-
tor relations meetings, investor relations professionals also highlight the importance of ensuring
securities are fairly priced. Marston (2004) documents similar results among the top 500 Euro-
pean companies where she finds agreement amongst investor relations professionals that the
activity helps reduce share price volatility, improve liquidity and lower the cost of capital. The
survey also highlighted the importance investor relations professionals place on investor meetings
that provide management with an opportunity to demonstrate the quality of the executive team
and to receive feedback from analysts and investors. Argenti et al. (2005) conducted 50




























interviews with prominent CEOs, CFOs and various investor relations professionals and found
consensus that investor relations should be seen as an integral and valuable part of firms’
corporate strategy.
Nevertheless, many market participants remain sceptical about the practical value of corporate
investor relations programmes. In a survey of over 1000 members of the Association for Invest-
ment Management and Research (now the CFA Institute), only 31% of respondents considered
investor relations to be a ‘very or extremely important’ source of information, while 62%
thought the quality of information emanating from corporate investor relations departments
was average to poor. One explanation for this unfavourable view is that investor relations officers
have insufficient access to top management. As RichWyler (CFA Institute spokesman) points out,
‘[M]ost IR officers are middle-level managers, and the 28 percent who are corporate officers are
frequently left out of the corporate information flow in a way that general counsel would never be’
(Connelly 2005, p. 44). Further, as one analyst commented, ‘[A]lthough not universally true, most
corporate investor relations programs are increasingly focusing on . . . promoting only the positive
aspects of the corporate story’ (IRMA Report 2002, p. 11).
3. Research question and setting
Prior research suggests that investment in investor relations can generate positive returns for firms
during non-crisis periods. We aim to extend existing research in this area by testing whether these
returns are preserved when corporate credibility is called into question.2 In particular, we seek
evidence on the link between the perceived quality of firms’ investor relations activities and
market behaviour during a period of heightened investor scepticism over accounting quality
and management credibility. Our decision to focus on a period of increased investor scepticism
is motivated by Brennan and Tamarowski’s conjecture (2000, p. 37) that the reputation benefits
associated with an effective investor relations strategy are likely to be particularly pronounced
during periods when corporate credibility is called into question.
Between October 2001 and September 2002, the financial reporting atmosphere in the USA
was contaminated with suspicion in response to a series of accounting scandals. In addition to
spectacular reporting failures at Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco and WorldCom, this period in
US financial reporting history witnessed record numbers of firms restating previously published
results following discovery of material reporting errors and irregularities (Gleason et al. 2008).
Further, as Gleason et al. (2008) demonstrate, the costs associated with these accounting failures
were not confined to scandal firms: loss of investor confidence in the integrity of financial report-
ing and in management credibility more generally was widespread. This window therefore pro-
vides an interesting experimental setting in which to assess the reputational impact of investor
relations when confidence in the honesty of management is subject to close scrutiny.3
The precise impact of investor relations during our test period is difficult to predict ex ante. If
the role of investor relations is to minimise investor risk by providing corporate information that is
clear, understandable and credible, and if such information risks are not fully diversifiable then
more effective investor relations can lower perceived risk (and ultimately firms’ cost of
capital). Investor relations proponents, therefore, suggest that a communication strategy based
on timely, transparent and unbiased reporting helps build trust and maintain management credi-
bility (Brennan and Tamarowski 2000, Bushee and Miller 2010). According to this view one
would expect firms with a reputation for high-quality investor relations to have been viewed
with less suspicion by market participants, resulting in superior market performance during our
event period relative to firms with less effective investor relations programmes.
An alternative view is that the accounting scandals occurring during this period served to
undermine the credibility of corporate communications activities generally, and investor relations




























practices in particular (Holmes Report 2002). Survey and anecdotal evidence provide some
support for this view (IRMA Report 2002, 2003). For example, 27% (21%) of respondents to
the 2003 (2002) IRMA survey indicated that they had formed a more negative view of investor
relations during 2002 (2001). As one senior sell-side analyst commented, ‘[I] am tired of the
shameless promotionalism [sic] and outright lies – investor disinformation is perhaps a more
appropriate term than investor relations’ (IRMA Report 2002, p. 11).4 Under such conditions,
cynical investors may be more inclined to view investor relations as a corporate marketing
device designed to exaggerate stocks’ prospects and put a positive spin on reported performance.
Rather than being reassured during this period by the presence of a prominent investor relations
programme, increasingly sceptical investors may have associated investor relations activities with
excessive corporate spin. Accordingly, firms with high-profile investor relations activities may
have suffered similar or even disproportionately greater reputation losses during 2001 and
2002 compared to firms with no track record of investor relations activity.
A third possibility is that investors’ perceptions of corporate credibility are independent of
investor relations activities, in which case the capital market costs imposed on firms during our
test periodwill be unrelated to investor relations quality. In the absence of clear theoretical and prac-
tical guidance on this issue, the link between firms’ investor relations activities and the market’s
assessment of managerial credibility is an empirical issue on which our paper seeks evidence.
4. Measuring investor relations quality
We measure investor relations quality using survey data obtained by the IRMA over the period
1996 through 2001. Beginning in 1996, the IRMA has published an annual report that seeks to
‘track changes in the investor relations industry, assess investors’ information needs, and draw
attention to companies that have distinguished themselves through their investor relations
performance’ (IRMA Report 2002, p. 3). Each year’s report presents results of an extensive
survey of investors’ perceptions of corporate investor relations practices. Further details of the
IRMA reports are summarised in an Appendix.
Previous empirical studies of disclosure quality have typically relied on Association for
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) surveys as a basis for scoring firms on their inves-
tor relations performance (e.g. Farragher et al. 1994, Lang and Lundholm 1996, Bushee and Noe
2000). However, the AIMR discontinued its disclosure rankings in 1997 after ranking fiscal year
1995. The IRMA data used in this study offers several advantages over the AIMR data.5 First, the
IRMA survey respondents are allowed an unrestricted choice of firms from which to select,
whereas the AIMR data were tightly restricted to certain industries (as well as to larger firms
within a chosen industry). Second, because the IRMA reports classify investor relations effective-
ness within size categories, we are able to investigate perceived investor relations quality control-
ling for size effects. Finally, the IRMA survey polls the views of both investment professionals
and retail investors. Given the growth in equity ownership by retail investors in the USA (Invest-
ment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association 2005), effective communication
with this group of shareholders is becoming an increasingly important component of firms’ inves-
tor relations strategy that was overlooked by the AIMR data.
5. Research design
The failure of Enron provides a unique opportunity to investigate whether investor relations repu-
tation affects capital market outcomes. Two complementary approaches are used to investigate the
link between investor relations performance and the extent of the capital market costs imposed on
US firms during 2001 and 2002. First, we test whether stock market contagion effects associated




























with news of financial reporting failures varied as a function of investor relations performance.
Second, we test for abnormal changes over the pre- and post-scandal periods in a range of firm-
level variables predicted to be associated with investor confidence. Both approaches employ a
matched-sample design to control for factors that might otherwise be correlated with investor
relations quality. Our control sample consists of firms that do not feature in the 1996–2001 IRMA
research reports (referred to as non-IRMA firms). Details of both approaches are outlined below.
5.1 Contagion tests
5.1.1 Univariate analysis
As a preliminary step we test whether the stock price reaction to news of financial reporting scan-
dals varied as a function of non-scandal firms’ perceived investor relations quality, before attempt-
ing to control for extraneous factors.
Prior research on stock price contagion documents significant market reactions for non-
announcing firms to news of accounting restatements (Xu et al. 2006, Gleason et al. 2008), bank-
ruptcy filings (Lang and Stulz 1992, Ferris et al. 1997) and the Enron collapse (Callen and Morel
2003). If effective investor relations helps preserve management credibility in times of heightened
market concerns about financial reporting quality then high-quality investor relations firms are
expected to have suffered significantly less negative contagion effects around key event dates
compared to less aggressive investor relations firms. Conversely, if the systemic decline in
market confidence concerning financial reporting practices and management integrity also
tainted investors’ perceptions of corporate investor relations generally, then proactive investor
relations firms may have experienced similar or even greater contagion effects as investors reas-
sessed the implications of current and past disclosures for firm performance and value.
The period preceding enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 provides a related
setting in which to test the relation between investor relations quality and the capital market. SOX
was introduced specifically to address problems associated with Enron and related scandals.6
However, confidence fluctuated over whether SOX would be enacted, providing an opportunity
to assess the faith market participants placed in investor relations (Jain and Rezaee 2006). More
specifically, in so far as effective investor relations firms were already perceived to be delivering
credible information to the market, lower quality investor relations firms are expected to have
been penalised more heavily by the market in response to unfavourable events that decreased
the Act’s perceived probability of enactment.
Prior research documents a series of events associated with Enron and the development of
SOX that resulted in systemic capital market effects. Our primary analysis focuses on eight
key event dates in 2001 and 2002 that prior research identifies as having generated the largest
market-wide effects.7 Three-day event windows centred on each of these eight dates are con-
structed. Further details of our event dates and associated announcement windows are summar-
ised in Table 1.
We examine the average stock price reaction of IRMA and matched (non-IRMA) firms to
these eight events. Non-IRMA firms are matched on industry, size and book-to-market to be com-
parable with IRMA firms in terms of risk. (See Section 6 for further details of the matching pro-
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Table 1. Details of short window event dates.
Event News date Study Detail Event window
Event 1 8 November
2001
Chaney and Philipich (2002),
Doogar et al. (2007)
Enron restates its financial
statements for the previous






Event 2 12 December
2001
Chaney and Philipich (2002),
Rauterkus and Song (2005),
Doogar et al. (2007)
Andersen’s CEO admits at a
Congressional testimony




Event 3 10 January
2002
Chaney and Philipich (2002),
Doogar et al. (2007),
Asthana et al. (2008)
Andersen notified the SEC,
the Department of Justice





Event 4 2–4 February
2002
Chaney and Philipich (2002),
Rauterkus and Song (2005),
Asthana et al. (2008)
Andersen announces creation
of an independent oversight
board, plus release of the
Powers Report detailing
extensive problems in the
audit of Enron and reveals
that the national office of




Event 5 14 March
2002
Rauterkus and Song (2005),
Krishnamurthy et al.
(2006), Doogar et al.
(2007)
US federal prosecutors
charged Andersen with a




Event 6 20 June 2002 Jain and Rezaee (2006) SEC proposed creation of a
nine-member Public
Company Accounting




Event 7 9 July 2002 Jain and Rezaee (2006),






calling for new ethic of
personal responsibility in
the business community.
Through 8–12 July 2002,
Senate considers S. 2673.






Event 8 19 July 2002 Jain and Rezaee (2006),
Zhang (2007)
Uncertainties voiced in a
Conference Committee
meeting regarding the form,





a. The table presents the eight events we have identified from prior literature, related to the Enron and Andersen debacle
and legislative events related to the eventual passage of the SOX Act, suggested to have the biggest market reaction.
b. Three-day event windows centred on each of the eight identified dates are constructed.




























where n is the number of firms in the sample, t represents an event day, di is the number of days in
event period i, Rjti is firm j’s day t stock return in event period i, R
I represents returns for firms in
the IRMA sample, and RN are returns for firms in the non-IRMA sample. We also examine the







AAR andTAAR canbeviewedas thepay-off fromahedge-return strategy that involves going long
in IRMAfirms and short in matched non-IRMAfirms. If investor relations served to maintain firms’
reputation during this period, the mean difference in raw returns between IRMA and non-IRMA
firms over the event windows will be positive. Alternatively, differences will be negative if distrust
in corporate reporting practices spilled over to firms with active investor relations programmes.
5.1.2 Multivariate tests
As a second step, we explore the cross-sectional relation between event-related stock returns and
investor relations quality after controlling for other firm-level factors that might influence stock
return reactions to these events. One such factor is auditor reputation. While the accounting scan-
dals clearly reduced confidence in the auditing profession, it is possible that firms audited by
Andersen were hit harder by the accounting scandals compared to firms audited by other firms
(Callen and Morel 2003, Asthana et al. 2008). To control for this possibility, we include an
indicator variable for Andersen clients. Other potential risk factors that might explain differences
in returns include size, book-to-market, firm profitability, sales growth and leverage (Fama and
French 1995, Bushee and Noe 2000). Finally, we also control for industry membership in case
contagion effects were more pronounced in certain sectors. Accordingly, we estimate the
following regression for each event i:
CRij =ai + b1iIRj + b2iAAj + b3iSIZEj + b4iBTMj + b5iROAj + b6iSGj + b7iLEVj
+ b8iIND MANFj + b9iIND WHLj + b10iIND SERVj + 1ij.
(3)
The dependent variable (CR) is firm j’s three-day cumulative return (centred on the announce-
ment day) for event i: CRij =
∑t=1
t=−1 Rjti. Definitions for explanatory variables are as follows: IR
is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is from the IRMA sample and zero other-
wise; AA is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is audited by Andersen and
zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Lang and Lundholm
1996); BTM is the book value to price ratio (Bushee and Noe 2000); ROA represents operating
income after depreciation (Compustat DATA178) scaled by total assets; SG is sales growth (Com-
pustat DATA12) (Bushee and Noe 2000); LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt to
total assets (Bushee and Noe 2000), and IND_MANF, IND_WHL and IND_SERV are indicator
variables representing the Manufacturing, Wholesale and Services industries, respectively.10
All explanatory variables are measured immediately prior to the start of our event period.
Although we use a matched pairs design in the univariate analysis, Equation (3) is estimated
on a pooled basis. Failure to control for the matched pairs structure of the data is expected to
reduce the power of our multivariate tests.
One limitation of estimating Equation (3) by OLS is the possibility of producing biased
standard errors for coefficient estimates when there is cross-sectional correlation and




























heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Cross-sectional correlation is particularly likely in our setting
since our eight news events were expected to impact all firms in the market at the same time. To
address these problems we adopt the estimation procedure proposed by Sefcik and Thompson
(1986) which uses portfolios constructed by weighting observations to account for cross-sectional
correlation and heteroscedasticity. The method involves constructing P portfolios, where P is the
number of intercepts and explanatory variables in Equation (3). Returns for each portfolio on day t
are computed as
Rpt = WIpRt (4)
where Rpt is the return for portfolio p on day t, Rt is an N × 1 vector of individual firms’ returns
on day t (N is the number of firms), andWIp is a 1 × N vector of weights for portfolio p. The vector









⎥⎦ = (X I (X ))−1X I (5)
where X is an N × P matrix. Each of the rows in matrixW is a unique set of portfolio weights
corresponding to an explanatory variable that are then used in Equation (4) to compute portfolio
returns. The resulting portfolio daily returns are then regressed on the market return and event
variables. Sefcik and Thompson (1986) show that with appropriate selection of portfolio
weights, estimates of portfolio abnormal returns are identical to coefficient estimates from
cross-sectional regressions. The weighting procedure accounts for potential collinearities
among firm characteristics and provides an opportunity to evaluate the relative importance of
different firm characteristics in explaining the market reaction to our eight news events.11
5.2 Investment viability and analysts’ earnings forecasts tests
Prior research documents a range of market-related benefits associated with informative disclos-
ure practices including greater press and analyst coverage, more accurate analyst earnings fore-
casts, lower book-to-price ratios, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts, lower
volatility in forecast revisions and lower volatility in returns (Bushee and Noe 2000, Bushee
and Miller 2010). Higher trading volume, press coverage and analyst following are indicative
of greater interest in the stock. Improved accuracy of analyst forecasts, lower forecast dispersion
and lower return volatility are evidence that analysts are better able to predict and agree on
expected earnings performance.12
Analysing the association between changes in these variables and corporate investor relations
performance provides an alternative means of evaluating the costs and benefits of investor
relations activity. In particular, if investor relations served to maintain firms’ reputation during
the period in question, changes in trading volume, analyst coverage and press coverage should
be positively associated with investor relations quality, while changes in forecast dispersion
and forecast error, and book-to-price and earnings-to-price should be negatively associated
with investor relations quality. Alternatively, no difference (a reversal) in these associations
would indicate that investor relations firms fared no better (worse) relative to control firms.
To compute the change in investment viability attributes we measure and compare variables
over the pre-scandal (September 2000–August 2001) and post-scandal (September 2002–August




























2003) periods. The pre-scandal period end date is 31 August 2001, one month before the start of
the first major accounting scandal (Enron). By September 2002, the start of the post-scandal
period, the majority of the accounting scandals had come to light. We proxy firms’ press coverage
by counting the number of articles related to each firm in theWall Street Journal (WSJ) during the
pre- and post-scandal periods. The company search is restricted to the citation and abstract to
increase the chances of finding articles related to a particular firm.13 Trading activity is measured
as the natural logarithm of annual share volume. We use annual earnings forecast properties for
the first year-end preceding 31 August 2000 and 31 August 2003 to compute our analyst forecast
variables. We take the number of analysts issuing an annual earnings forecast in the last month
prior to the earnings announcement for both years as a proxy for analyst following. We
assume zero analyst following for 4 firms in the IRMA sample and 15 firms in the non-IRMA
sample that are absent from I/B/E/S. Forecast dispersion for both years is measured as the stan-
dard deviation of earnings per share (eps) estimates in the last month prior to the earnings
announcement, scaled by the stock price on the last day of the fiscal year-end. Forecast accuracy
is measured as the absolute difference between actual eps and median forecasted eps, deflated by
stock price on the last day of the fiscal year-end for both years. The last consensus forecast for
each firm prior to the earnings announcement is used to compute forecast error.14 We deflate fore-
cast error by the year-end stock price to address scale problems (Lang and Lundholm 1996).
6. Sample, data and descriptive statistics
We use the 1996–2001 IRMA reports to construct our sample of firms deemed to have operated
effective investor relations programmes. Firms achieving either winner or honourable mention
status in a given year are classified as having effective investor relations programmes. We omit
financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and firms operating in other regulated industries (SIC
codes 4000–4999) as the role of investor relations may differ in these industries. Finally,
because the focus of our analysis relates to the period October 2001 through September 2002,
we retain only those firms with price data available on CRSP for this entire period. Applying
these sampling criteria yields a final sample of 122 firms deemed to have operated an effective
investor relations programme in at least one year between 1995 and 2000.15 Details of the
sample selection process are presented in Table 2.
Results reveal considerable industry clustering: the majority of observations in our sample are
drawn from the Manufacturing sector (59%), followed by Services (25%), Wholesale and Retail
(13%), and Mining and Construction (3%). Reasons for this sample clustering are unclear and
beyond the scope of our analysis. Since in subsequent analyses sample firms are matched with
an industry control group, we do not expect such concentration to bias our tests to any significant
degree. We are nevertheless mindful that industry clustering may reduce the generalisability of
our findings to sectors not included in our final sample.
Our control sample of firms that did not feature in the IRMA reports is matched with IRMA
firms on the basis of industry, size and book-to-market ratio using the following sequential sort
procedure. For each firm-year in the IRMA sample, we identify all non-IRMA sample firms on
the CRSP database in the same one-digit SIC category that (a) received no mention of their inves-
tor relations practices in any of the 1996–2001 IRMA reports, (b) had at least two years of price
data prior to the IRMA award-year, and (c) had price data for our event period. The first criterion
helps maximise potential differences in investor relations quality across IRMA and control firm
samples. The second criterion guarantees that control firms existed at the time the IRMA award
was made and as such were part of the universe of active stocks from which survey respondents
made their selection. The third criterion ensures that control firms were active during our test
period. Industry-matched non-IRMA firms are then ranked by market capitalisation measured




























at 31 August 2001 and assigned to one of 20 equal-sized portfolios. Finally, the control firm in the
same industry-market capitalisation portfolio as our IRMA firm that minimises the difference in
book-to-market ratios was selected.16
Table 3 presents mean and median characteristics for IRMA and non-IRMA firms immedi-
ately prior to the start of our event period.
This comparison provides evidence on company attributes associated with our proxy for
investor relations quality. We examine three size measures: log of market value of equity
(SIZE), total assets (ASSETS) and sales (SALES).17 In addition, we report two measures of firm
performance: one-year compounded monthly returns (RET) and return on assets (ROA). We
report two measures of growth: the earnings-to-price ratio (EP) and book-to-market (BM).
We also examine leverage (LEV), press coverage (PRESS) and trading volume (VOL). Finally,
we compute analyst forecast characteristics including analyst following (ANAL), forecast error
(ERROR) and forecast dispersion (DISP).
Material differences between IRMA and non-IRMA firms are apparent for a number of vari-
ables examined. Means and median values of SIZE, ASSETS and SALES are significantly larger
for IRMA firms compared to their respective control firms, suggesting that our matching pro-
cedure did not succeed in eliminating all size differences. (Multivariate tests reported in Table
6 control explicitly for these residual size effects.) IRMA firms also perform worse than their
non-IRMA counterparts during the pre-event period in terms of both accounting (ROA) and
market-based (RET) metrics. Consistent with results documented by Bushee and Miller (2010),
IRMA firms are associated with significantly higher press coverage and analyst following.
IRMA firms also display significantly higher trading activity during the pre-event period.
Contrary to Lang and Lundholm (1996) but consistent with Farragher et al. (1994), we find no
significant difference in forecast error properties between the two samples. Unlike Farragher
et al. (1994), however, we also fail to find any significant difference in forecast dispersion.
Table 2. Sample selection.
Total number of firms mentioned in 1996–2003 IRMA reports 947
Less:
Firms missing from CRSP (including Asia-Pacific IR in the US, European IR in the US,
Latin America IR in the US categories)
155
Firms appearing in the 2002 or 2003 reports 217
Book value of shareholders’ funds not available on Compustat 5
Firms not achieving ‘Winner’ or ‘Honourable Mention’ status 368
Firms in the Most Improved IR, M&A Investor Relations, IR during Friendly Takeover, IR
during Contested Takeover and IR for an IPO categories
37
Financial firms (SIC groups 6000–6999) 21
Firms operating in other regulated industries (SIC groups 4000–4999) 18




a. The IRMA reports include three distinct categories within each award, that is, Winners, Honourable Mentions and
Mentions. We exclude firms from the sample that only got a mention to increase the power of the tests.
b. The same firm can appear in more than one award category in each year and can appear in more than one award year.
Our sample consists of the number of unique firms from the period 1996–2001.
c. Some of the award categories were ‘closed’ as they have a restricted potential winners sample due to its nature. These
were Most Improved IR, M&A Investor Relations, IR during Friendly Takeover, IR during Contested Takeover and IR
for an IPO. Firms in these categories were excluded from the sample due to their contentious nature.
d. We omit financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and firms operating in other regulated industries (SIC codes 4000–
4999) because the role of investor relations practices in these industries is likely to differ significantly from the
investor relations activities of firms operating in unregulated industries.




























Although analyst forecast properties are similar for both samples, results for our other investment





Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and results of the raw return analysis for the eight event
windows.
Positive differences in the average returns between IRMA and matching non-IRMA firms
indicate that IRMA firms’ returns are on average higher than their non-IRMA counterparts
over the event window. Only for Event 1 is the average raw return difference found to be positive
and significant at conventional test levels. Contrary to the prediction that effective investor
relations helped insulate firms from the negative contagion effects triggered by Enron and
associated scandals, mean and median return differences are negative for six of the eight event
windows, three of which are significant using a two-tailed parametric t-test (Events 2, 4 and 6)
and four of which are significant based on two-tailed non-parametric tests (Events 2, 4, 5
and 6). Moreover, these negative three-day returns appear to be economically significant. For
example, 20.009 on the IR variable for Event 6 equates to a loss of 66% on a compound
annual basis.
Table 3. Summary statistics of differences between IRMA and non-IRMA samples.
IRMA sample Control sample
p-value for
difference
Variable N Mean Median Mean Median Means Medians
SIZE 122 15.631 15.682 15.221 15.565 0.001 0.001
RET 122 20.176 20.100 0.134 0.185 0.001 0.001
BM 121 0.301 0.286 0.316 0.283 0.913 0.467
EP 121 20.097 0.040 20.022 0.043 0.357 0.586
PRESS 122 17.795 8.000 5.689 2.000 0.001 0.001
VOL 122 15.443 15.468 14.449 14.556 0.001 0.001
ASSETS 121 14799 4411 7588 2932 0.074 0.045
LEV 121 0.156 0.111 0.190 0.163 0.150 0.064
SALES 121 12451 4198 7440 2565 0.033 0.145
ROA 121 0.097 0.110 0.101 0.131 0.844 0.856
ERROR_Mean 98 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.467 0.679
ERROR_Med 98 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.404 0.146
DISP 102 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.768 0.691
ANAL 122 16.828 17.000 10.959 12.000 0.001 0.001
Note:
a. This table provides means and medians for firm characteristics before the event period. The IRMA sample refers to the
sample of effective investor relations firms and the control column refers to the control sample matched on industry,
size and BM. The last two columns test for differences in the mean and median between samples. SIZE is the log of the
market value of equity, RET is the one-year monthly compounded stock returns, BM is the book value–price ratio, EP
is the earnings–price ratio, PRESS is number of articles mentioning the company in theWall Street Journal, VOL is the
log of annual share volume, ANAL is the number of analysts providing an annual earnings forecast, ERROR is the
absolute value of the analyst forecast error, deflated by the price at fiscal year-end, DISP is the standard deviation
of forecasts deflated by stock price, ASSETS measures Total Assets (Compustat DATA6), LEV measures leverage
by Long-Term Debt (Compustat DATA9) scaled by Total Assets, SALES represents Sales (Compustat DATA12)
and ROA represents Operating Income After Depreciation (Compustat DATA178) scaled by Total Assets.




























Aggregating across all event days also reveals statistically significant negative return
differences between IRMA and their non-IMRA matching counterparts. Similar conclusions
are apparent for the (untabulated) difference in cumulative raw returns computed over the eight
short window event periods. Collectively, findings reported in Table 4 provide little support for
the prediction that firms with effective investor relations fared better during this period. Rather,
results reveal that firms recognised as having effective investor relations actually fared worse
when the market received negative news regarding financial reporting credibility.
Our findings are consistent with the wave of corporate scandals having tarnished the reputation
of the investor relations industry. While superior investor relations firms traded at a premium prior
to the event period as a consequence of their communication activities, news of systemic account-
ing failures caused disproportionately large downgrades for such firms due to concerns over the
credibility of management generally and corporate communications practices in particular.
From this perspective, while superior investor relations fails to provide a truly reliable signal of
corporate credibility and integrity, it nevertheless has the power to influence market valuation.
During non-crisis periods, effective investor relations may serve to boost investor confidence in
management and corporate performance, causing such firms to trade at a premium relative to
their peers with less well-developed communication practices. However, when corporate credi-
bility and financial reporting integrity are called into question, we conjecture that such firms
have proportionately more to lose as investors systematically revise downwards their perceptions
of management quality and financial probity. Paradoxically, therefore, market confidence in firms
with well-developed communication practices is dented to a larger degree by the accounting
scandals than for firms with little or no track record in investor relations activities. A competing
explanation for the return differences reported in Table 4 is due to unmodelled risk differences
between treatment and control firms. We explore this issue further in our multivariate tests.
The positive average return difference documented for Event 1 is worthy of further discussion.
As this was the earliest event in the test window, we conjecture that the reputation of investor
Table 4. Testing the difference in average returns between matched IRMA and non-IRMA firms.
Probability values
Event N Mean Std dev. Min Median Max t-test Sign Wilcoxon
Event 1 122 0.005 0.047 20.254 0.003 0.229 0.043 0.075 0.042
Event 2 122 20.007 0.050 20.401 20.003 0.151 0.009 0.158 0.045
Event 3 122 20.001 0.035 20.125 20.002 0.222 0.564 0.321 0.286
Event 4 122 20.005 0.048 20.299 20.004 0.229 0.035 0.005 0.001
Event 5 122 20.003 0.040 20.328 20.004 0.166 0.144 0.040 0.056
Event 6 122 20.009 0.045 20.286 20.005 0.170 0.000 0.001 0.000
Event 7 122 0.000 0.054 20.210 0.002 0.524 0.904 0.562 0.883
Event 8 122 20.002 0.051 20.243 20.001 0.279 0.379 0.712 0.744
All Events 122 20.003 0.047 20.401 20.002 0.524 0.001 0.002 0.000
Notes:
a. The first column indicates the event window and the third column shows the mean difference in the raw returns













b. Refer to Table 1 for definition of events.




























relations activities remained intact at this point and as a consequence this is the only event
window where IRMA firms experienced fewer market costs relative to their non-IRMA counter-
parts. Viewed in this way, our findings serve to reinforce the potential benefits of effective investor
relations during normal market conditions.
In addition to examining whether there was a differential stock price effect for the two samples
over the short news event windows, we also test for differential price effects over the whole 12-
month period between October 2001 and September 2002. Market-adjusted cumulative monthly
returns for both samples are presented in Table 5.18
For both samples, after adjusting for the cumulated monthly CRSP value-weighted market
return, cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive. Hence both samples outperformed
the market over the year. However, tests fail to reveal any significant statistical difference between
the two samples. Accordingly, these null results again fail to support the view that effective inves-
tor relations helped insulate firms from problems during this period.
7.1.2 Multivariate results
Table 6 reports results for multivariate tests designed to control for other potential confounding
factors.
Findings are consistent with univariate results in so far as they provide no evidence to support
claims that an effective investor relations programme protected firms against contagion associated
with corporate financial scandals. In particular, the estimated coefficient on the investor relations
indicator variable is either indistinguishable from zero (Events 1–5 and 7–8) or significantly
negative (Event 6) for the eight event windows examined in Table 6. These findings reveal
that IRMA firms were no better insulated than non-IRMA firms from market downgrades result-
ing from investor concerns over the integrity of management and financial reporting practices.
Indeed, although less pronounced than our univariate findings, there is evidence that firms with
award-winning investor relations programmes were penalised more heavily by the market
during our event windows compared to non-IRMA control firms: six of the coefficient estimates
on IR are negative, with Event 6 being significant at the 5% level. At best, therefore, our findings
suggest that high-quality investor relations practices established during non-crisis periods provide
no guarantee that a firm will be insulated from declines in investor confidence arising from the
corporate misdeeds of other firms.
Results for the control variables included in Equation (3) are generally insignificant. Only
coefficient estimates on the indicator variable for Andersen clients (Event 7), sales growth
Table 5. Cumulative abnormal returns over the long-run event window (October 2001–September 2002).


















0.049 122 0.123∗∗∗ 122 1.16 0.786 21.170 2497.5
(0.113)∗∗ 122 (0.175)∗∗∗ 122 (0.246) (0.432) (0.244) (0.205)
Notes:
a. This table shows the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return for the sample of IRMA firms and non-IRMA firms
over the 12-month (October 2001–September 2002) event window using monthly return data. Statistical tests were
performed for differences between the IRMA and non-IRMA sample means and between the matched differences
between the 122 IRMA and non-IRMA firms. We use the CRSP value-weighted index returns as market index returns.
b. Significant differences from zero at 10, 5 and 1% are indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.




























(Events 4 and 6) and leverage (Event 7) are significantly different from zero at conventional
levels. Findings suggest that our inability to detect positive pricing effects for investor relations
activities is not due to the omission of potentially confounding factors. The results also indicate
that our matching procedure has been relatively successful in identifying non-IRMA firms with
similar risk profiles.
7.2 Investment viability and analysts’ earnings forecasts tests
Table 7 reports mean and median changes in company characteristics between pre-scandal
(September 2000–August 2001) and post-scandal (September 2002–August 2003) periods.
If investor relations served to maintain firms’ reputation during this period, changes in trading
volume, analyst following and press coverage should be positively associated with investor
relations quality, whereas changes in forecast dispersion, forecast error, book-to-price and earn-
ings-to-price ratios should be negatively associated with investor relations quality.
Table 6. Multivariate analysis.
10 Nov 12 Dec 10 Jan 4 Feb 14 Mar 20 Jun 9 Jul 19 Jul
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
Variables (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Intercept 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 20.028 20.023
(0.670) (0.505) (0.842) (0.879) (0.883) (0.892) (0.265) (0.357)
IR 0.005 20.006 20.002 20.005 20.003 20.009 0.001 20.002
(0.196) (0.149) (0.714) (0.269) (0.404) (0.035) (0.843) (0.633)
DAA 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008 20.003
(0.265) (0.550) (0.728) (0.937) (0.632) (0.850) (0.035) (0.447)
SIZE 20.001 20.001 20.001 0.000 0.000 20.001 0.000 20.001
(0.692) (0.389) (0.705) (0.797) (0.861) (0.671) (0.883) (0.440)
BTM 20.001 20.001 20.002 0.001 20.001 0.001 0.001 20.001
(0.441) (0.458) (0.244) (0.509) (0.578) (0.645) (0.627) (0.529)
ROA 20.003 20.021 0.008 20.012 20.007 20.013 0.000 20.001
(0.828) (0.130) (0.574) (0.385) (0.594) (0.331) (0.994) (0.925)
SG 0.002 20.002 20.001 20.003 20.001 20.004 20.002 20.002
(0.114) (0.150) (0.524) (0.043) (0.465) (0.007) (0.263) (0.283)
LEV 0.009 0.002 20.012 20.004 0.006 0.020 0.025 20.001
(0.501) (0.848) (0.351) (0.777) (0.620) (0.112) (0.050) (0.968)
IND_MANF 20.010 0.001 0.000 20.004 20.005 20.008 0.003 0.015
(0.328) (0.895) (0.994) (0.732) (0.662) (0.452) (0.771) (0.156)
IND_WHL 20.011 0.004 20.008 20.005 20.007 20.001 0.002 0.018
(0.367) (0.763) (0.498) (0.689) (0.547) (0.944) (0.884) (0.121)
IND_SERV 0.001 0.005 0.005 20.014 20.015 20.012 0.012 0.017
(0.894) (0.679) (0.655) (0.206) (0.165) (0.270) (0.263) (0.124)
Notes:
a. This table presents coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for the regression models. The cumulative return
over each event window acts as our dependent variable and this is regressed on several control variables. IR is the
dummy indicator for when the firm is from the IRMA sample or not. DAA is a dummy indicator for when the firm
is audited by Andersen or not. SIZE is the log of the market value of equity and BTM is the book value–price
ratio. ROA represents Operating Income after Depreciation (Compustat DATA178) scaled by Total Assets and SG
is Sales Growth (Compustat DATA12). LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of Long-Term Debt to Total Assets.
Three dummies identifying the industry the firm belongs to: IND_MANF, IND_WHL and IND_SERV represent the
Manufacturing, Wholesale and Services industry, respectively.
b. Estimation based on the Sefcik and Thompson method (1986), which uses portfolios constructed by weighting
observations to account for cross-sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity.




























Although both samples experience a median fall in press coverage (PRESS) over the period,
the fall experienced by the IRMA sample firms is twice as large as that of the control sample.
Similarly, IRMA firms experience a median drop in analyst following of two analysts (ANAL)
whereas the median loss of coverage was zero for the control sample. Furthermore, although
both samples experience a small increase in trading activity (VOL) over the period, the increase
for IRMA firms is less than half that of the control sample. These results do not support the view
that investor relations insulated firms from the negative market shocks. There again exists some
evidence that distrust in corporate reporting practices spilled over to investor relations practices.
Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996), Farragher et al. (1994) and Adrem (1999) report lower
dispersion among analyst forecasts for firms with more informative disclosures. We fail to find
a significant difference in the change in dispersion between the two samples over this period.
Similarly, we find no difference in the change in forecast error for both samples. Again, these
results do not support the view that investor relations firms were insulated from the effects of
the credibility crisis.
Overall, the picture presented by these results is somewhat mixed. There is some evidence
that IRMA firms were viewed more negatively by analysts as a result of the scandals. Other evi-
dence suggests they were treated similarly to control firms. Notably, however, there is no evidence
suggesting that analysts exhibited more confidence in (and interest towards) IRMA firms relative
to their non-IRMA counterparts during the scandal period. In sum, investors appear to have been
unimpressed by previously established investor relations credentials.
Table 7. Difference-in-difference tests.
DIRMA sample Dcontrol sample
p-value for
difference
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Means Medians
SIZE 112 20.047 20.012 20.079 0.019 0.636 0.637
RET 119 0.553 0.318 0.197 0.005 0.028 0.001
BM 112 20.096 0.019 0.057 0.020 0.071 0.395
EP 112 20.008 20.006 20.015 0.004 0.852 0.925
PRESS 122 24.738 22.000 0.057 21.000 0.009 0.090
VOL 119 0.010 0.090 0.249 0.237 0.001 0.001
ASSETS 115 2455.247 187.035 744.099 159.527 0.241 0.040
LEV 115 0.022 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.233 0.573
SALES 115 2134.969 16.954 2258.170 52.828 0.827 0.351
ROA 115 20.147 20.034 20.011 0.003 0.197 0.062
ERROR_Mean 94 0.009 0.000 20.001 0.000 0.252 1.000
ERROR_Med 94 0.010 0.000 20.002 0.000 0.215 0.606
DISP 94 20.001 0.000 20.002 0.000 0.438 0.353
ANAL 122 21.754 22.000 20.066 0.000 0.016 0.004
Note:
a. This table provides means and medians for changes in firm characteristics during the period of market negativity. The
IRMA sample refers to the sample of effective investor relations firms and the control column refers to the control
sample matched on industry, size and BM. The last two columns test for differences in the mean and median
between samples. SIZE is the log of the market value of equity, RET is the one-year monthly compounded stock
returns, BM is the book value–price ratio, EP is the earnings–price ratio, PRESS is number of articles mentioning
the company in the Wall Street Journal, VOL is the log of annual share volume, ANAL is the number of analysts
providing an annual earnings forecast, ERROR_Mean is the absolute value of the analyst forecast error using the
mean consensus forecasts, deflated by the price at fiscal year-end, ERROR_Med is the absolute value of the analyst
forecast error using the median consensus forecasts, deflated by the price at fiscal year end, DISP is the standard
deviation of forecasts deflated by stock price, ASSETS measures Total Assets (Compustat DATA6), LEV measures
leverage by Long-Term Debt (Compustat DATA9) scaled by Total Assets, SALES represents Sales (Compustat
DATA12) and ROA represents Operating Income After Depreciation (Compustat DATA178) scaled by Total Assets.





























We conduct a number of untabulated sensitivity checks on the robustness of results reported above.
In the first set of tests, we use an alternative method of selecting event dates for our study. In the
second set of tests, we expand the sample to include other firms recognised in the IRMA reports.
7.3.1 Events related to other major scandals in 2002
Instead of relying on event dates identified in prior studies, we construct a sample of critical news
event dates relating to the Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco and WorldCom scandals from a keyword
search of theWSJ during calendar years 2001 and 2002.We focus on these large scandals to restrict
our attention to cases with a potential market-wide effect. All WSJ articles relating to these four
scandals were examined. After removing confirmatory and duplicate stories, 119 articles remain.
Because our interest lies in examining the contagion effects relating to these events, we exclude
articles where the contagion effect is expected to be negligible.19 This procedure results in a
final sample of 75 event dates running from 16 October 2001 to 27 September 2002. The first
date in our sample is the announcement by Enron of a third quarter loss of $618 million owing
to a $1 billion one-off charge, together with a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholders’ equity. The
last event date is the announcement that WorldCom’s former controller had pleaded guilty to
three counts of conspiracy, securities fraud and making false statements to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Three-day event windows centred on each of the 75 WSJ dates are con-
structed. Where event windows overlap, they are grouped together to form a single extended
window, resulting in 30 unique event windows ranging from 3 to 10 days’ duration.
Untabulated results reveal that on average across all event days, firms recognised as having
effective investor relations suffered larger price falls when the market received negative news
regarding accounting scandals. On closer examination, eight event windows have a significantly
negative average raw return difference between the IRMA and control samples. In comparison,
there are only two event windows where a significant positive average raw return difference is
evident. Findings indicate that more often than not, differences in average returns between
IRMA and control firms are either non-significant at conventional significance levels or signifi-
cantly negative. Hence, these results provide no evidence that good investor relations firms
were insulated to a greater degree from the credibility crisis.
7.3.2 Sample refinements
The final sample of 122 firms was obtained after a rigorous refinement of the IRMAdata. However,
additional tests were conducted to ensure that results are robust to these refinements. In particular,
we reinstated all firms in receipt of at least one positive mention in the IRMA reports, resulting in a
larger sample of 321 firms. The number of event windows with a negative and statistically signifi-
cant difference in average raw return between IRMA andmatched control firms is reduced from the
four events reported in Table 4 to two events (Events 2 and 6) for the eight events summarised in
Table 1. However, aggregating across all event days still yields a significant negative difference in
the average raw return between the case and matched control sample. Furthermore, Event 1 con-
tinues to be the only windowwhere we observe a significant positive average raw return difference.
Although less pronounced, these findings are broadly consistent with our main results.
8. Conclusion
This paper provides the first investigation into the capital market consequences of investor
relations activities during a period of general distrust over corporate credibility. Although pre-
vious studies shed light on the specific activities undertaken by the investor relations process




























and the associated benefits (Marston 2008), no study to date has empirically tested the capital
market implications of investor relations when corporate credibility is called into question.
Prior literature suggests that investor relations plays an important role in reducing information
risk leading to several capital market benefits but these results are confined to non-crisis
trading periods (Bushee and Miller 2010, Agarwal et al. 2008). We examine whether investor
relations helps uphold investor confidence during difficult market conditions caused by a wave
of high-profile accounting scandals. Our empirical tests examine a sample of 122 companies
recognised for their superior investor relations practices by the US Investor Relations Magazine
Awards (IRMA) over the period 1996–2001. Tests compare IRMA firms to a control sample
matched on industry, book-to-market ratio and firm size. Two complementary approaches are
used to investigate the link between investor relations and the extent of the market-related
costs imposed on US firms during this period. We fail to find any support for the view that a
reputation for effective investor relations served to insulate firms from the systemic decline in
investor confidence that occurred during our sample period. On the contrary, results indicate
that firms with established investor relations reputations fared marginally worse on a series of
market-related dimensions.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that heightened investor scepticism concerning
the general credibility of management and financial reporting surrounding Enron and related events
damaged the confidence investors had hitherto placed in investor relations. Instead of serving to insu-
late firms from systematic market downgrades resulting from heightened market scepticism regard-
ing accounting quality and management credibility, Enron and subsequent scandals appear to have
undermined established views of what constituted good investor relations. Viewed this way, while
investor relations may have the potential to influence market valuations in particular circumstances,
the activity may not serve as a truly reliable signal of credibility. Under normal market conditions,
firms with well-developed investor relations practices may trade at a premium relative to their
peers because effective investor relations helps increase investor confidence. However, when this
confidence is dented, as it clearly was around the time of the Enron scandal, firms previously
recognised for their investor relations activities may be more negatively affected.
Our findings can be viewed from a costly signalling perspective (Akerlof 1970). According to
this theory, a signal is only effective if it can be used to distinguish superior firms (products, ser-
vices, etc.) from inferior ones. From this perspective, investor relations activities only provide an
effective costly signal for high-quality firms if lower quality firms are prevented from mimicking
such a strategy (e.g. due to cost). One means through which firms can increase the cost associated
with investor relations activities is to credibly commit to releasing bad news (as well as good
news) in timely and transparent manner. Whether this can be achieved remains to be seen.
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Notes
1. Hong and Huang (2005) present a model where management engage in investor relations for reasons
unrelated to stock price improvement. In their model, investor relations expenditure is driven by




























insiders’ incentives to enhance the liquidity of their equity stake in case they are forced to sell stock for
liquidity reasons in the future.
2. For an economic analysis of how confidence in business as a whole can wax and wane as a function of
the level of news about corporate scandals and wrong-doing, see Akerlof and Shiller (2009).
3. Tighter regulations imposed on companies concerning the disclosure of price-sensitive information
occuring immediately before and after our test period including Regulation Fair Disclosure (SEC
2000) and Global Research Analyst Settlement (2005), have heightened the importance placed on
corporate communications and the need for timely, transparent and honest financial information.
These regulatory demands for corporate transparency were intended to force investor relations
professionals to improve relations with cynical investors and regulators.
4. Enron ranked second in the ‘Best Overall IR’ category by IRM research in both 1999 and 2000.
5. The AIMR and IRMA reports have adopted fundamentally different perspectives on the relation
between disclosure policy and investor relations. AIMR viewed investor relations as a component
of firms’ general disclosure policy, as evidenced by investor relations being one of the three subcate-
gories used to determine firms’ overall disclosure level. In contrast, the IRMA reports view investor
relations as the underlying construct, of which disclosure policy represents one (important) element.
6. A detailed history of the events leading to the passing of SOX can be found in Li et al. (2008). Negative
abnormal returns around some congressional events leading up to its enactment have been detected by
several studies (Jain and Rezaee 2006, Zhang 2007, Li et al. 2008). Several explanations for this result
have been proposed. In particular, the negative reaction may have indicated the ineffectiveness of the
reform proposed or doubt amongst investors over the eventual passage of the Act (Jain and Rezaee
2006). Many commentators have also criticised the Act for imposing excessive costs on companies
with little clear benefit (Jain and Rezaee 2006, Zhang 2007, Li et al. 2008).
7. We also conduct tests using an alternative method of selecting event dates. Instead of using dates from
prior studies, we identified a sample of critical news events relating to the Enron, Global Crossing,
Tyco andWorldCom scandals from a keyword search of theWall Street Journal (WSJ) during calendar
years 2001 and 2002 (see Section 7.3.1).
8. Most of the information transfer methods used in previous studies adjust returns for market risk when
computing abnormal returns (Lang and Stulz 1992, Callen and Morel 2003, Asthana et al. 2008).
However, we use raw stock returns since adjusting for market returns is not necessary in this design
as the control firms have been matched according to industry, size and book-to-market, which
control for systematic risk.
9. In addition, we have also computed the compounded cumulative return as a check on whether the
portfolio rebalancing implied in the simple averaging method makes any difference to the results.
Results are unchanged.
10. The base case industry is Mining and Construction.
11. See Sefcik and Thompson (1986) and Li et al. (2008) for a more detailed explanation of the implemen-
tation of this method.
12. In keeping with the literature (Farragher et al. 1994, Bushee and Miller 2010, Agarwal et al. 2008), we
do not consider bias in analyst forecasts because we have no clear prediction what the effect of better
investor relations might be on this variable. We also consider bias to be less important than forecast
accuracy in the context of our analysis.
13. Searching citations and abstracts involves the following fields in Factiva: Author, Personal Name,
Abstract, Product Name, Document Title, Subject, Company, Publication Name (Source) and Geo-
graphical Name.
14. As a sensitivity check we also compute forecast error using the average monthly forecast error
computed over the first 12-month fiscal period preceding 31 August 2000 and 31 August 2003.
15. Sensitivity tests were conducted to ensure that our results are robust to these refinements. We obtain
similar results when we include the firms that featured in the IRMA reports but were not winners or
honourable mentions, financial and regulated firms, firms from all award categories and when we
extend our sample to include firms that featured in the 2002 and 2003 IRM awards.
16. We conduct three different matching sensitivity checks on our data. First, matching by book-to-market
to identify a control firm is a contentious issue as one could argue that higher valuations are one of the
proposed consequences of effective investor relations. Therefore, matching on the basis of book-
to-market may reduce our ability to detect valuation effects of investor relations and bias against
the demand for investor relations in our control firms. Hence, we run our tests again, matching by
year, industry and size alone. Instead of matching by the same size portfolio, we match by the smallest
absolute difference in market capitalisation. Furthermore, we stipulate that the control firm can be no




























more than 50% bigger or smaller than the IRMA firm. Second, we refine the industry match to firms
within the same two-digit SIC category. For those cases where a match was unsuccessful (N ¼ 29),
one-digit SIC codes were used as a secondary matching procedure to ensure maximum sample size.
Third, the control sample was found through matching by year, size and firms within the same two-
digit SIC category. Again, instead of matching by the same size portfolio, we match by the smallest
absolute difference in market capitalisation. Furthermore, the control firm can be no more than 50%
bigger or smaller than the IRMA firm. Conclusions based on all three alternative matching procedures
are consistent with those reported in the main text.
17. We use both market-based and non-market-based measures of size in case of problems with
endogeneity.
18. The CRSP value-weighted market return was used as a proxy for market return.
19. News related to downgrades by debt agencies were excluded, for example, on 29 October 2001
Moody’s downgraded Enron’s long-term debt. Other news items that were considered largely firm
specific were also excluded, for example, on 3 April 2002 WorldCom said it was cutting 3700 jobs
in the USA.
20. The method used to compute the scores is deemed proprietary information and is not discussed in the
IRMA research reports. Awards are also made for investor relations effectiveness across a further six
specialist categories (not decomposed by size): Most Improved IR, M&A Investor Relations, Asia-
Pacific IR in the US, European IR in the US, Latin America IR in the US, and IR for an IPO. We
exclude these six categories from our analysis due to their limited scope and their focus on foreign firms.
21. Use of the four size categories was first introduced in the 2000 research report. Prior to that, three (two)
size groupings were used in the 1998 and 1999 (1997) reports.
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Investor Relations Magazine employs a specialist research agency to administer the surveys and write the
reports. The basis of each year’s survey is a target set of equity market professionals and retail investors.
Thomson Financial/Carson supplies the list of investment professionals drawn from their client database.
Professional investors are classified into buy-side and sell-side professionals to ensure equitable represen-
tation of each category. Buy-side individuals are then further subdivided into three categories: those with
a small-cap following; those with assets under management of less than $5 billion; and those whose
assets under management exceed $5 billion. Finally, individuals in the latter two groups are classified
into portfolio managers and analysts using the Thomson Financial/Carson job function indicator.
Barron’s supplies details of retail investors. The resulting pool of market participants targeted by the
survey represents a significant slice of the US investment community. For example, 17,156 (16,647) invest-
ment professionals and 2000 (1697) retail investors were invited to participate in the 2001 (2000) survey.
Annual survey response rates vary between 10 and 12%.
Pre-selected versions of the main questionnaire, together with a separate small-cap questionnaire, are
distributed to buy-side, sell-side and individual investor groups towards the end of January each year and
the survey closes in early February. In addition to probing respondents’ views of general trends in investor
relations activities over the preceding year, the questionnaire asks investors to identify firms that, in
their view, exhibited effective investor relations strategies. Firms are scored on their investor relations
performance across the following 12 categories:20
† Grand Prix † Conferencing†
† Annual Report† † Retail Market IR
† CEO † Investment Community Meetings†
† Financial Media Relations† † Corporate Governance
† Investor Relations Officer† † Senior Management Communications†
† Corporate Advertising † Disclosure Policy†
Each category is divided into four size classifications according to market capitalisation: ,$2.5 billion,
$2.5–10 billion, $10–30 billion and .$30 billion.21 The Grand Prix category is a composite score based on
responses to eight questions [Best Overall Investor Relations Program (weighted 2/3 of total score), plus
those categories marked †]. Details of all firms with a non-zero score for one or more of the investor relations
categories listed above are disclosed in the final IRMA Report. Firms are ranked within each investor
relations category–size group according to their score, and firms ranking in outright or joint first place
are declared ‘winners’. Firms ranking below first place that in IRM’s view are also deserving of recognition
due to their high score are awarded ‘honourable mentions’.
Although we consider this survey to be the best measure of investor relations quality in the market, the
IRMA data does have certain shortcomings. One disadvantage is that the IRMA survey results may be
subject to greater response bias than the AIMR data. In particular, because respondents self-select to com-
plete the IRMA questionnaire, their motivation for participating in the survey and nominating a particular
firm may be driven by factors other than simply identifying the most effective investor relations programme.
However, since respondents’ views remain anonymous in the published reports, gains to submitting biased
evaluations are unclear. Second, because the IRMA rankings rely partly on retail investors’ views, they may
contain greater noise if these respondents are less knowledgeable about effective investor relations practices.
IRMA seeks to address this problem by using a special version of the questionnaire specifically targeted at
non-expert investors. Any residual noise in the scores, while reducing the power of the empirical tests, is not
expected to cause our results to be biased. Finally, as firms are scored under 12 different categories, the
relation between the categories and investor relations quality may not be the same for each.
90 K. Peasnell et al.
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